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Social Work Practice and Technological
Disasters: The Navajo Uranium Experience
Susan E. Dawson, Ph.D.
Utah State University

Findings of a community case study of Navajo uranium workers and
theirfamilies are presented in light of the effects of technologicaldisasters.
The workers and their families were exposed to occupational and environmental hazards associated with the mining and milling of uranium.
Implications for social work practice and education are presented using
the concepts of a therapeutic community and victim typology.

Introduction
There is a growing effort within the scientific community to
identify both the short- and long-term consequences of natural
and technological disasters. Two areas of concern in the literature are the development of therapeutic communities to help
cope with disasters and the identification of different types of
victimization. This paper will address these two areas within
the context of technological disasters, and will present a case
study of Navajo uranium workers. Finally, implications for social work practice are discussed.
Natural and Technological Disasters
Distinctions between the stressors of natural versus technological disasters have been well delineated in the literature
(see Baum, Fleming, and Davidson, 1983; Baum, Fleming, and
Singer, 1983; and Cuthbertson and Nigg, 1987). Technological
disasters, e.g., nuclear plant accidents and toxic spills, indicate
the collapse of humanmade systems, while natural disasters,
e.g., floods and earthquakes, occur without human intervention.
Technological disasters such as radioactive contamination
may leave no visible evidence in the environment, but can lead
to chronic stress and sickness. These resulting health effects are
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perceived to be unrelated to natural causes, indicating instead a
failure of technologies that were once considered under control
(Baum, Fleming, and Davidson, 1983). The individual is likely to
believe that someone, or some group, is ultimately responsible
for the disaster (Baum, Fleming, and Singer, 1983).
Kasperson and Pijawka (1985) have presented a framework
for understanding the problems of communities coping with
both types of disasters. They point out that technological disasters make the identification of health consequences and liability difficult because of latent effects, whereas natural disasters
have immediately observable consequences. For example, when
a tornado strikes, a community mobilizes quickly. The disaster agent is known and clearly defined. With a technological
disaster, however, the community may not mobilize quickly
because of chronicity and/or ambiguity regarding the disaster
agent and its consequences. Love Canal, New York, for instance,
demonstrated community division in response to the disaster
agent. In technological disasters, the nonvictimized members
of the community may begin to resent the victimized members
because of scientific uncertainties about the hazard, the potential
for adverse economic impacts, media attention, and prolonged
debate. All of these may increase community division.
Kasperson and Pijawka (1985) also have identified the importance of a therapeutic post-disaster community as a powerful means of stress reduction. Cuthbertson and Nigg (1987)
have noted that therapeutic communities tend to develop where
there is little ambiguity concerning the disaster agent, creating
emotional and physical support, solidarity, unity of purpose,
and hopefulness for renewed normalcy. In addition, they state
that an effective therapeutic community is identified by the following factors: general consensus on the nature and risk level of
the disaster agent; beliefs that the disaster could not have been
prevented; indiscriminate, highly visible, and communitywide
damage; and obvious and urgent needs toward which feelings
and remedial action can be directed.
Cuthbertson and Nigg (1987) have also developed a typology which discusses a therapeutic community that emerges as
a response to technological disasters. They assume that a therapeutic community may not develop in technological disasters
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because of community conflict, or conflictual adaptation, and
divide community groups in two major categories-primary
and secondary victim clusters. Primary victims include those individuals who either lived close to or were knowingly exposed
to the technologically created hazard that produces negative
health effects. Secondary victims include community residents
who consider themselves to be adversely affected by the public
acknowledgment of a technological event.
Within the category of primary victims there are two subgroups: the hazard-endangered victims and the hazard-disclaimer victims. The hazard-endangered victims perceive the
disaster agent as a definite threat to health, while hazarddisclaimer victims do not. Cuthbertson and Nigg (1987) note
that hazard-endangered victims generally lose confidence that
a supportive social environment will emerge. They feel they are
in a crisis situation which will not be resolved and are unable to
reduce their anxiety through community support. Group members worry for the immediate and future health of their families
and themselves, and may feel suspicious toward experts and
government officials perceived as uncaring and unresponsive.
Hazard-disclaimer victims do not perceive a technological
agent as hazardous or capable of producing negative health
problems. They also do not consider hazard-endangered victims
to be the true victims of the technological hazard; instead they
see the endangered victims as either augmenting the controversy or as opportunists.
Secondary victims of technological disasters are also classified into two subgroups-the perpetrator victims and the
bystander victims. The perpetrator victims are "individuals
labeled as unethical, opportunistic, and uncaring by hazard
endangered victims and their supporters" (Cuthbertson and
Nigg, 1987:478). These may include individuals from businesses
and/or government. Victims from this group may believe they
have been singled out unfairly and may attempt to prove their
innocence.
Bystander victims are community members not living
within the exposed area of the technological agent. They perceive themselves as victims because of their association with
the issue, expressing concern for their own economic interests
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and the community's return to normalcy. Bystander victims
were not identified in this study because all of the respondents
either worked in uranium mining and milling or lived within
an exposed area of the Navajo Reservation.
Cuthbertson and Nigg (1987) state that secondary victims
tend to consider themselves casualties of the technological
agent's negative effects. Similar to primary victims, secondary
victims are likely to lose confidence when there is official unresponsiveness, incompetence, and unaccountability by scientific
experts and government officials.
The chart below presents the Cuthbertson and Nigg (1987)
typology indicating the relationship between the victim clusters.

Technological Disaster Victim Typology
I. Primary victim cluster-victims who lived close to or were
exposed to the disaster agent
A. Hazard-endangered victim cluster-victims who perceived the disaster agent as a threat
B. Hazard-disclaimer victim cluster-victims who did not
perceive the disaster agent as a threat
II. Secondary victim cluster-victims who perceived themselves
as adversely affected by public acknowledgement of the
technological event
A. Perpetrator victim cluster-victims who may believe they
have been unfairly identified as causing the technological
event
B. Bystander victim cluster-victims who do not live within
the exposed area of the technological agent but feel victimized by their association with the event

In sum, the therapeutic community and victim typology
are important concepts for understanding the process of coping
with technological disasters such as the Navajo experience with
uranium mining and milling.
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Methodology

The purpose of this study was to conduct a social field
investigation of Navajo workers in the uranium industry from
the late 1940s into the early 1980s. These individuals had uncompensated occupational illnesses related to working in the
uranium mines and mills. The author conducted interviews
from a purposive sample of 55 Navajo respondents and 33 key
informants, combining participant observation and interviews.
Because there is no exhaustive sampling frame of Navajo uranium workers, a random sample was not conducted. A purposive and snowball sample was created with assistance from a
Navajo tribal key informant. Of the total of 55 respondents, 43
were miners, seven were millworkers (15 widows responded for
their deceased husbands), and five were residents whose family
members had perceived environmentally-related illnesses. All
of these respondents fit in the Cuthbertson and Nigg hazardendangered group. The study was conducted in 1989 on the
Navajo Reservation in Tuba City and Blue Gap, Arizona, and
the Shiprock, New Mexico, areas.
The author, who was the only researcher and who does
not speak Navajo, worked with two interpreters throughout the
project. The one- to two-hour interview schedule was structured
with open- and closed-ended questions and included questions
regarding occupational histories and environmental and occupational perceptions of hazards. All interviews were arranged
and conducted in person by the author with the exception of
Blue Gap, AZ. A chapter house official interviewed respondents
in this area.
Discussion
The Navajo people are a rapidly growing group of Native
Americans. In 1950, Navajo living on the reservation numbered
69, 167; this increased to 165, 005 by 1988 (Navajo Nation, 1988).
The tribal land base of 17,202,118 acres is rich in nonrenewable
energy sources including coal, gas, oil, and uranium. Because
poverty is rampant, with an estimated 43 percent unemployment and approximately 44 percent of families and individuals
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living below the poverty line (Navajo Nation, 1988), energy
development and the creation of energy-related jobs are serious
concerns for the Navajo people. The Navajo Reservation is also
likely to be a prime target for nuclear waste storage/disposal
and other potential technological hazards.
With the advent of the atomic age, a uranium boom occurred
in the Four Corners area (the border junctures of Arizona,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah) from the 1940s through the
1960s, resulting in the creation of approximately 2,500 mines
both on and off the Navajo Reservation (National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, 1971). In addition, four uranium mills were built on Navajo land during this period to
process the uranium ore. While there is no overall statistic for
the number of Navajo uranium miners and millers, estimates
include up to 3,000.
The miners worked at the first stage of the process digging
the raw uranium both out of mines, called dogholes, and above
ground in strip mines. The millworkers worked in the second
stage of the cycle, processing the ore into a finer substance called
yellowcake, or uranium oxides. The negative health effects of
this uranium process surfaced twenty to thirty years later, creating'a chronic technological disaster threatening both uranium
workers, tribal members, and the general environment.
Initially, the uranium industry was favored by some Navajo
because it created jobs as well as much needed revenues
for the Navajo Nation. Many Navajo took pride in assisting
the United States government in developing the materials for
atomic weapons and energy. However, in the 1970s uranium
miners who developed lung cancer and/or respiratory problems were noticed by an Indian Health Service pulmonary specialist, Dr. Leon Gottlieb. Navajo workers were never informed
of the hazards of radiation, despite the fact that previous studies demonstrated how working with uranium was hazardous
(National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1971).
There is no word in Navajo for radiation. Prior to the creation,
in 1969, of the Mine Safety and Health Administration, workers
in the study said they were not provided with personal protective equipment, such as masks, earplugs, and dosimeters or
radiation monitoring badges. In addition, they were allowed
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to wear uranium covered clothing home for laundering. One
miner noted:
There was no ventilation. The blast from the mine, the air was so
dusty and smoky all over, that you couldn't see. Still, we had to
go back into the mine after the blast. Our children used to play
in the shower room after everybody left for home. There were no
masks, no safety glasses and no earplugs.
Workers have since indicated that if they had been informed of the occupational hazards, they would have reconsidered uranium industry employment. Navajo workers felt that,
in addition to being exposed to unsafe work practices, they
were betrayed by the United States government, particularly
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the United States
Public Health Service (USPHS). A cover-up by the USPHS, in
the name of national security, kept crucial health information
from the workers (see John Begay v. U.S. of America, 1985). In
the 1950s, the mining companies agreed to supply the USPHS
with miners' names for an epidemiologic study on radiation
effects with one provision. The USPHS agreed not to inform
the workers of the potential health hazards associated with
radiation while they were monitoring their health nor to inform
them that their illnesses were radiation-related upon diagnosis.
One Navajo supervisor interviewed by the author reported that
he was told by his employer not to inform his workers about
any of the dangers or health effects of radiation. He stated,
"They told us to only tell [the workers] about safety-not about
radiation dangers."
All miners in the study reported that the mines were largely
unventilated. Drinking water was often collected from the
walls of the mines, and workers often ate their lunches with
unwashed hands. They wore their dirty workclothes home,
exposing their family members to contaminated materials. Similarly, the millworkers wore their yellowcake-covered clothing
home and exposed family members to uranium oxides. Some
miners also reported they were forced to enter the unventilated
mines directly after blasting, unlike Anglo workers who worked
with them.
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Because of the cover-up and lack of explanation by experts
and government officials, the Navajo people were not able to
make informed decisions about the hazards of nuclear development. It was not until recently that evidence of occupational
illnesses and the identification of environmental hazards on the
reservation led to the concept of a technological disaster. A
miner's wife explains, "There used to be old people. But I don't
think the new generation will live to 100 anymore. They might
be 50 or 60 and then they are gone because of the [contaminated]
areas they live in."
In addition to the long-term negative health results of mining and milling, the uranium industry was responsible for leaving minewastes and mill tailings on the Navajo Reservation. The
abandoned mines, minewastes, and tailings provided play areas
for Navajo children. One miner's daughter explained, "We used
to herd the sheep to the [abandoned] mines and play there. In
the winter, the sheep would sleep in the mines to get out of
the cold." The Department of Energy (DOE) Abandoned Mine
Lands (AML) Reclamation office, in an attempt to rectify the
situation, is engaged in abating the hazards associated with the
numerous mines. Uranium mills have or are in the process of
being dismantled and buried along with the thousands of tons
of mill tailings.
The Navajo, in experiencing a chronic technological disaster,
are ambiguous about health problems and the environment.
Radiation is insidious; it cannot be seen, felt, or smelled, and
presents a difficult hazard for community members to identify.
While a health emergency was recognized recently pertaining
to the uranium workers overall, there has been considerable
confusion by the rest of the Navajo population about the environment. Questions abound concerning latency and exposure
to the technological hazard. A widow who lives next to a
dismantled mill explained, "We are poor people. The people
at the mill [after it was abandoned] didn't put up any fences
and didn't tell anyone in the family that the mill area might
be hazardous to our health. I want to talk to the owners to ask
for compensation." She also indicated that "other people" had
been to her house asking questions about health problems. This
worried her.
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Unique cultural factors greatly affect interpretation of
events. The Navajo, for instance, are a people who live in clans
and are tied to the land. Hence it is unusual for Navajo people,
especially the traditional Navajo, to relocate to another locality,
or tribal chapter. One worker stated, "I don't think there's
anyplace that's safe. Uranium is everywhere. We were going to
build at [another town] but decided not to as it is unsafe because
of the kids." Some Navajo may be fatalistic about prophecies
concerning energy development. Such prophecies state that the
ground is not to be disturbed and, if this occurs, health problems
will prevail. One Navajo community resident explained that a
medicine man told her that the development of uranium would
bring negative consequences to the Navajo.
It is first important to note that in the scientific community,
there is now little ambiguity in identification of the disaster
agent. Research, for the most part, supports the relationship
between uranium mining and lung cancer (Butler et al., 1986;
Gottlieb and Husen, 1982; National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, 1971; Roscoe and Mason, 1984; Samet et al.,
1984). In 1990, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act was
passed by Congress, providing compensation for the Navajo
uranium miners and the atomic downwind residents. However,
this took place only after decades of work-related exposure to
the technological hazard.
As previously stated, ambiguity still prevails among the
Navajo concerning the general environmental contamination
associated with the uranium processes on the reservation. It is
at this point in the cycle of the disaster where the Cuthbertson
and Nigg typology becomes particularly relevant. Of the primary victims, there are two distinct groups: those considering
themselves to be hazard-endangered victims, and those who
are hazard-disclaimers. The hazard-endangered victims believe
they were exposed to uranium through either the workplace or
the environment. Members of the group include people with
ill or deceased family members. The families may be concerned
about the ongoing threat of illness, given the latency of radiation
exposure. The therapeutic community did emerge for many
uranium miners and their families once the correlation between
their illnesses and exposures was made; however, a therapeutic
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community has not fully developed for the millworkers or the
general Navajo population exposed to tailings and minewastes.
Many examples of hazard-endangered victims were identified in the study. One traditional Navajo elder explained she has
experienced social isolation because she lives on mining land.
She said that relatives and friends would not attend a ceremony
at her hogan, a traditional Navajo home, because they feared
contamination from the mine waste. Her cattle drink from the
nearby pond, which she believes is contaminated, and her sheep
graze on the land. Adding to her fears, she explained how
"someone from the government" came out to test her hogan
and land for radioactivity and never informed her of the results.
Because of these factors, she felt lonely and isolated and at a loss
about what to do.
A sheepherder, who has experienced illness in her family,
explained that the government told her not to graze her sheep
on the contaminated land. She was worried because her sheep
had been grazing all over the land for a number of years, and
feared she or others would eventually become ill from eating
the sheep.
Residents also felt contempt for the government and the
companies who exploited the workers, their families, and tribal
members. Many felt they were used as guinea pigs to further
the government's atomic program. There was also ambivalence
among the hazard-endangered cluster to discuss their concerns
with the media and other experts. Respondents stated repeatedly that they did not feel it would "do any good to talk about
it because nothing happens." Yet, because of pending legislation, lawsuits, and compensation claims, respondents were
motivated to keep the issue alive.
Thirty of the fifty-five respondents, representing the hazardendangered group, expressed concern that materials used in the
construction of their homes and outbuildings were hazardous.
For example, one worker pointed out that the stairsteps to his
home were taken from the uranium mill outside Tuba City, Arizona. He did not know if they were radioactive, but wondered
if they could be hazardous. Other concerned respondents had
used scrap metal for various purposes which was taken from
the mines or the dismantled mills. Some millworkers and their
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families were provided with cinder block homes at the millsite.
These cinder blocks had been made from radioactive materials
and have since been demolished. All of the millworkers and
their families indicated concern that they had been exposed to
excessive levels of radiation as a result.
In what is known as Red Valley, Arizona, some area residents' homes had been built of radioactive materials. The government built second homes for these residents but neglected to
dismantle some of the original contaminated homes. As a result,
some families were living in both homes. In another example,
a miner's widow had a contaminated bread oven and hogan
on her property which were bulldozed by the government.
She claimed the debris were still left on her land and feared
continuing exposure which she thinks could result in health
problems.
In Blue Gap, Arizona, the residents live near abandoned
mines which are not on the DOE's abatement list. The author
was informed that many of the residents believed cancers and
other health problems are connected to the abandoned mines.
One resident expressed concern that the drinking water was
affected and wondered why Blue Gap was not on the abatement
list. When the researcher contacted a DOE Abandoned Mine
Land officer, she was informed that the situation did not present
sufficient risk for abatement.
The hazard-endangered victims developed a sense of solidarity and sense of control over the years through chapter house
associations and support groups, including the Uranium Radiation Victims' Committee of Navajo Uranium Miners. These
groups helped to provide technical assistance, to educate about
the disaster agent and its consequences, and to mobilize around
legislative activities.
The hazard-disclaimer cluster included key informants and
uranium workers. They were initially exposed to the disaster
agent but later believed the hazard had been mitigated. This
has led to a lack of consensus and solidarity among tribal
members. Not all of the uranium workers who were contacted
experienced health problems, and some of them did not feel that
the disaster agent was a hazard. Some key informants and other
workers believed that some of the workers were opportunists
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and were trying to seek compensation without a documented
occupational illness. Those individuals who could be identified
as part of the victim-disclaimer group believed that the uranium
had been cleaned up for the most part and posed no serious
health threat.
One resident who lived across the road from a family who
had received considerable publicity because of health problems
and possible contamination, believed he, his family, and land
were safe. He was not concerned for his livestock and believed
the well water, which is tested by the Navajo Tribe, was also safe
for consumption. Given the ambiguity, it is possible that tribal
members in this cluster may be reducing cognitive dissonance
to anesthetize themselves against the disaster agent and its
consequences.
The other category of secondary victims are perpetrator victims. They include the United States government, particularly
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). They repeatedly denied
they were culpable for exposing uranium workers to hazards.
They also claimed to be unaware of the dangers of radiation
(see Begay et al.). Later, the government stated that because
of national security, certain risks needed to be assumed. It
is also clear uranium companies knew about the dangers of
radiation and were reluctant to install safety measures because
of associated costs (Ringholz, 1989).
These examples point out the usefulness of the victim typology and the therapeutic community in addressing the psychosocial aspects of technological disasters. The typology is
helpful in delineating various groups within a community lacking solidarity, and it is a valuable tool for examining community
conflict and cohesion. It must be kept in mind, however, that
the clusters are ideal types and therefore groups may not be
mutually exclusive and exhaustive with respect to the cluster
categories.
The Navajo study also demonstrates how difficult it is for
the therapeutic community to develop in a technological disaster. In this case, given the chronic nature of the disaster cycle, the therapeutic community only emerged upon recognition
that the uranium miners' illnesses were work-related. For the
other tribal members, the therapeutic community has not fully

Technological Disasters

17

emerged, primarily due to various groups' ambiguities about
the disaster agent and its consequences.
Implications for Social Work
The implications for social work practice in technological
disasters are not well defined. Coulter and Noss (1988:298)
assert that, in response to technological disasters, "Social work
intervention at the public health level to forestall the crises
described should become routine." They suggest that informed
social support networks are needed along with traditional avenues of social support, including advocacy, crisis intervention,
community organizing, and individual work. It has been noted
that disaster victims usually turn to family and friends, coworkers, local community groups and related others for help before
they turn to government agencies and helping professionals
(Garbarino, 1985; Stone and Levine, 1985).
Social workers need to be familiar with problems of occupational and environmental hazards and consequences in their
communities. They may be some of the first people within the
community to recognize a technological disaster through their
clients and professional colleagues. As a result, social workers
may be instrumental in providing crucial information regarding
entitlement programs and health benefits as well as legal and
health referrals. In addition, social workers need to take detailed
client occupational histories concerning employment data and
hazard and exposure information to help document the hazard.
Because of the chronic nature of many technological hazards, the therapeutic community may not emerge, leaving victims without social supports. It is then useful to utilize the
typology presented by Cuthbertson and Nigg (1987), which
offers a mechanism for differentiating victim clusters. It also
provides the social worker with different frames of reference in
viewing the problem and working with clients and the community. The typology becomes useful to the social worker in
terms of providing a "map" of the technological disaster. It
may then be used for community organizing and mobilizing
to promote solidarity, lessen ambiguity, and create consensus toward building a therapeutic community. In individual
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practice, the typology can assist the social worker in understanding the client's frame of reference toward the disaster. This
knowledge will then assist the social worker with intervention
strategies.
In working with Native Americans affected by technological
disasters, it is important to recognize their specific cultural and
economic situations. In the case of the Navajo, relocation because of technological damage is not likely to occur given their
clan-based social structure. The lack of ability to relocate, due to
the confines of the reservation boundaries, may contribute to a
sense of futility and powerlessness among some of the victims.
By contrast, non-Indians would be more likely to relocate under
similar disaster conditions since they are not clan-based.
When working with Native American victims of technological disasters, it is important to understand the ramifications
of their poverty, their lack of resources, and their remote rural
nature. The social worker may need to make home visits to
clients; it is likely they will not have telephones, transportation,
or other means of accessing social services.
In general, the Navajo experience is unique in terms of
a chronic technological disaster, blending cultural and socioenvironmental issues. Uranium workers and community residents were not able to make informed choices early on regarding the disaster agent because of covert governmental activities.
Because the Navajo did not have adequate information regarding the latent nature of the disaster agent, there was a lack of
ability to bring the issue to the forefront. Only when health
problems emerged among exposed workers and residents did
legal and health experts become involved in the disaster.
In sum, social work practice that is informed and sensitive
is crucial in responding to technological disasters. In addition,
rapid mobilization becomes essential especially when social
support structures normally associated with natural disasters
do not emerge. By incorporating the victimization typology
into their practices, social workers may assist communities in
forming therapeutic communities thereby furthering community cohesion and a return to normalcy.
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